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Schabes: Roemer v. Commissioner

COMMENT

ROEMER V. COMMISSIONER
TAXATION-The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower

Tax Court's decision to differentiate between defamation to an individual's personal and professional reputationsfor purposes of section 104(a)(2) by determining the nature of the tort of defamation
as based on state law; the entire awardincluding both compensatory
and punitive damages is non-taxable in a defamation suit; the appropriate distinctionfor section 104(a)(2) is between personal and
nonpersonal injuries. 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th
Cir. 1983).
"But he that filches from me my good name Robs me of that

which not enriches him, And makes me poor indeed."1

W. Shakespeare, Othello
Since the inception of the federal tax system in the United
States, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has adopted the underlying proposition that all income is includable in gross income as
defined in the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC").2 Congress, however,
W. SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, Act III, Scene III.
2. [T]he term "gross income" (a) Includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service ... of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from
professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property
...; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business
carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source
whatever....
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065 (1919). This section was redesignated in 1928 as § 22(a), Rev. Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 22(a), 45 Stat. 791, 797; it contained
substantially the same language as § 213(a). In 1939, § 22(a) was codified as part of the
Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C., ch. 2, § 22(a), 53 Stat. 1, 9 (1939).
Over the years this language has been simplified. The current definition is: "Except as
1.

otherwise provided .

. .,

gross income means all income from whatever source derived . ..."

I.R.C. § 61(a) (1976). This section corresponds to § 22(a) of the 1939 Code and, despite the
simplified language, the prior section's all-inclusive nature of statutory gross income is unaffected. Section 61 (a) is in fact as broad in scope as its predecessor. Commissioner v. Glenshaw
Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 & n.1 I (1955) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
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has enacted specific exceptions to this rule.3 For example, IRC section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income "the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal
injuries or sickness." 4 The language in this Code section is quite
broad 5 and the courts have interpreted the phrase "personal injuries"
to include both physical and nonphysical injuries.' As a result, damages for wrongful death,7 breach of a promise of marriage,8 invasion
of privacy, 9 alienation of affection,10 and surrender of custody
A 18, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4017, 4168).
3. See Infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text. See Phillips, The Tax Consequences
of a Punitive Damages Award, 31 HASTINGs L.J. 909, 925-28 (1980).
4. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
The original statute, in 1918, provided that gross income did not include "[a]mounts received, through accident or health insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received whether
Rev. Act of 1918, ch. 18,
by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness ......
Pub. L. No. 254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065-66 (1919). This section was revised, Rev.
Act of 1921, ch. 136, Pub. L. No. 98, § 213(b)(6), 42 Stat. 227, 238; Rev. Act of 1924, ch.
234, § 213, 43 Stat. 253, 268; Rev. Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 213(b)(6), 44 Stat. 9, 24-25, and
redesignated in 1928. Rev. Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 22(b)(5), 45 Stat. 791, 798. There were
further revisions, Rev. Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 22(b)(5), 47 Stat. 169, 179; Rev. Act of 1934,
ch. 277, § 22(b)(5), 48 Stat. 680, 687; Rev. Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 22(b)(5), 49 Stat. 1648,
1658; Rev. Act of 1938, ch. 289, Pub. L. No. 554, § 22(b)(5), 52 Stat. 447, 458; I.R.C. of
1939, § 22(b)(5), amended by Rev. Act of 1942, ch. 619, Pub. L. No. 753, § 127, 56 Stat.
798, 825 (1942). This section was divided into different subsections in 1954 and the portion
relating to damages received for personal injuries was labeled § 104(a)(2). I.R.C. of 1954, ch.
736, § 104(a)(2), 68A Stat. 3, 30 (1954).
5. The Code section uses the term "personal injuries," without further amplification in
its description of what is excludable under I.R.C. § 104. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
6. In fact one ground for reversal in Roemer was the lower court's misplaced reliance
upon a distinction between physical and nonphysical injuries in construing § 104(a)(2). 716
F.2d 693, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1983). See Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32, 40 (1972), acq.
1972-2 C.B. 3.
The Treasury Regulation construing § 104(a)(2) also fails to make a distinction between
physical and nonphysical injuries. It states, in pertinent part: "The term 'damages received
(whether by suit or agreement)' means an amount received. . . through prosecution of a legal
suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights. ..." Treas. Reg. § 1.104(c) (1956) (emphasis added).
7. Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960); see Brooks v.
United States, 273 F. Supp. 619, 628-29 (D.S.C. 1967) (a damage award for wrongful death
is non-taxable to the extent it encompasses prospective earnings); see also I.T. 2420, 7-2 C.B.
123 (1928); Rev. Rul. 19, 1954-1 C.B. 179.
8. McDonald v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 1340, acq. 7-2 C.B. 26 (1928); see also I.T.
1804, 2-2 C.B. 61 (1923).
9. See Meyer v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 920, 923 (E.D. Tenn. 1959) (had plaintiff
incurred damages from invasion of privacy, the award would have been non-taxable); Starrels
v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962); Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962); Roosevelt v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 77 (1964).
For a discussion of the invasion of privacy issue, see Fouts, Payments Received in Settlement

of Litigation and Claims, 25 N.Y.U.

ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N,
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rights"1 have all been held to be excludable from gross income.

Although damages for the defamation of an individual's reputation have also been held to be excludable from gross income, 12 the
courts have established a dichotomy in their treatment of damage
awards for defamation to an individual's personal reputation and to
his professional reputation.1 A personal reputation can be defined as
the name or general estimation attributed to an individual in the
community in which he lives. 4 In contrast, a professional reputation-grounded on one's personal reputation"--not only includes an
individual's personal traits but also encompasses his competence and
ability in the profession in which he practices." Although a damage
award for the defamation of an individual's personal reputation has
been held to be non-taxable,' 7 the taxability of a damage award for
an individual's professional reputation continues to remain unset-

tled-despite a recent Ninth Circuit ruling.' 8
In Roemer v. Commissioner,"9 the Tax Court held that the entire award received for the defamation of an individual's professional
reputation was outside the scope of section 104(a)(2) and was there-

10. Ehrlich v. Higgins, 52 F. Supp. 805, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); see Rev. Rul. 77, 1974-1
C.B. 33.
11. According to Rev. Rul. 77, 1974-1 C.B. 33, the surrender of custody rights is nontaxable. However, in Ehrlich v. Higgins, 52 F. Supp. 805, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), the court
indicated that this represented a payment for relinquishment of a legal right which was distinguishable from damages received for an injury, and was therefore taxable.
12. Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927), acq. 7-1 C.B. 14 (1928); Sol. Op.
132, 1-1 C.B. 92, 94 (1922).
13. Glynn v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 116 (1981), affd mem., 676 F.2d 682 (1st Cir.
1982); Wolfson v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1981); see Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927), acq. 7-1 C.B. 14 (1928).
14. See L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 2, 4 (1978); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY

OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE

1105 (10th ed. 1981)

(definition of

reputation).
15. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398, 414 (1982) (Wilbur, J., dissenting)
("defamation is by definition personal to the plaintiff."), revd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
16. 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983). In differentiating between an individual's reputation and character the Ninth Circuit concluded that while an individual can maintain both
professional and personal relationships, in a defamation suit "all of the harm that is done flows
from the same personal attack on the defamed individual." Id.
17. Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927), acq. 7-1 C.B. 14 (1928).
For purposes of this comment, the term non-taxable will mean that the amount received is
not includable in gross income.
18. Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983);
Wolfson v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1981) (injury to medical student's reputation is taxable), a.f'g 47 T.C.M. (P-H) 1852 (1978) (where the court left open the question as
to the appropriate tax status of an award for defamation to an individual's professional
reputation).
19. 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
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fore taxable. The court failed, however, to explain adequately how.
an individual's professional reputation is sufficiently distinguishable
from his personal reputation so as to be afforded different tax treatment. 20 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax
Court because it "concluded that the tax court's analysis [with regard to personal and professional reputations] confuses a personal
injury with its consequences and illogically distinguishes physical
from nonphysical personal injuries.' ' 21 The court noted that "[t]he
relevant distinction [in section 104(a)(2)] is between personal and
nonpersonal injuries, not between physical and nonphysical injuries." 22 While focusing on the nature of a defamation tort, the court
determined that under California state law, defamation of an individual is a personal injury and therefore, the award should be excludable from gross income under section 104(a)(2). 23
The legal analysis in this opinion, although reaching the correct
result, did not directly address the consequences of a defamation suit
involving an individual's business reputation outside the confines of
the State of California. 24 Moreover, the circuit court neither incorporated an analysis of the relevant Tax Court decisions in its opinion
nor corrected the lower court's misinterpretation of prior federal tax
decisions involving defamation suits. Thus, the purpose of this comment is to set forth a supplemental analysis to the circuit court's
decision, in order to provide future courts with the basis for understanding and correlating section 104(a)(2) with the applicable tax
court case law. In so doing, it is hoped that the Ninth Circuit's decision will not be limited in its future application merely to a case
involving the interpretation of state law, but rather that the ensuing
analysis may illustrate the underlying policies as well as the Congressional intent which necessitate the nontaxable status of such
awards, regardless of what particular state jurisdiction the case
arises in.
This comment is divided into three parts: (1) A general discussion of the facts as well as the majority and two dissenting Tax
20. The court merely stated that "a distinction must be made." Id. at 405.
21. 716 F.2d at 697.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 700. Since the punitive damages were awarded for the same personal injuries
as the compensatory damages, the punitive damages were also excludable. Id.
24. Under this court's approach, it appears that a court in a different jurisdiction will
also have to determine the nature of its defamation law. Perhaps the court could have avoided
this by deciding the case using federal tax decisions. See infra notes 155-63 and accompanying
text.
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Court opinions in Roemer; (2) an in-depth analysis of two possible
policies underlying section 104(a)(2) and its treatment of nonphysical injury awards, followed by a separate discussion of defamation
awards; and (3) a detailed examination of how the Tax Court in
Roemer misinterpreted prior case law. This comment concludes that
a social sympathy Suffered-Enough Concept2 5 is the rationale for the
underlying policy of section 104(a)(2).2 ' Furthermore, as a result of
courts' treatment of awards under section 104(a)(2), there is no reason, for tax purposes, to differentiate between an award for defamation to an individual's personal reputation and professional reputation. Finally, this comment concludes that since damages in Roemer
were awarded due to a personal injury, the Tax Court reached an
incorrect decision and was properly reversed on appeal.
1. THE Roemer DECISION
A.

The Facts

In 1965, Paul F. Roemer, Jr., an established insurance broker,
commenced a lawsuit against Retail Credit Company ("Retail") for
submitting defamatory reports to Roemer's prospective employer.2 8
One report, the falsity of which was admitted by Retail,29 stated in
part that the "petitioner was ignorant in insurance matters, neglected his clients' affairs, [and] was recently fired from his position
as president of an insurance firm. .... ,,3o This report also emphasized that "[flormer employment associates indicate[d] there [was]
good reason to question this individual's honesty. .

. ."'I'As

a result

of these reports, Roemer was denied additional insurance agency li25. "[T]he taxation of recoveries carved from pain and suffering is offensive, and the
victim is more to be pitied rather than taxed." Harnett, Torts and Taxes, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv.
614, 627 (1952). This is a policy concern. Thus, it appears that a "great social feeling engulfs

the tax logic." Id.
26. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
27. The following represents the procedural history of the Roemer defamation suit: In
Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 368, 83 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1970), the appellate
court reversed a lower court decision for the plaintiff because of an erroneous jury instruction.
Id. Five years later, in the case of Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 82 (1975), after retrial, the appellate court affirmed a lower court's award of $290,000.
The tax status of this award was litigated in 1982, Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398
(1982), and on September 22, 1983 the Ninth Circuit reversed. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
28. 79 T.C. at 400.
29. Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 368, 370, 83 Cal. Rptr. 540, 542

(1970).
30.
31.

79 T.C. at 400.
Brief for Petitioners at 6, Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982).
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censes.32 Moreover, Roemer's general reputation also suffered in the
community in which he worked and resided because "most of his
clients were also his friends. 3
In 1975, after prolonged litigation, the California Court of Appeals affirmed a jury award for $40,000 compensatory damages and
$250,000 punitive damages. 3 ' In that same year, Mr. and Mrs.
Roemer filed a joint federal income tax return with the IRS, 5 reporting a total of $47,14236 originating from the law suit. Subsequently, the plaintiffs received a deficiency notice from the IRS
claiming that the entire38 judgment received 37 should have been included in gross income.
A trial was held in October, 1981, for redetermination of the
deficiency.39 In August, 1982, the Tax Court, with three judges dissenting, held that both the compensatory and punitive damage components of the award received by the Roemers were taxable. 4° In
September, 1983, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unanimously reversed.' 1
32. 716 F.2d at 695.
33. Id.
34. Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 931, 119 Cal. Rptr. 88, 85
(1975).
35. 79 T.C. at 399. This amount included $16,020 from the damage portion of the recovery, $7751 for costs and $23,321 for interest. 79 T.C. at 403-04.
36. In his amended petition, Roemer alleged that $23,771, which represented the damage award and costs, was incorrectly reported. 79 T.C. at 404.
37. Of the total award, the net amount received by Roemer was $147,140. Below is a
calculation of this amount:
Compensatory damages
Punitive damages
Interest and costs

$ 40,000
250,000
85,601
$375,601

Less:

Attorney's fees

$220,710

Costs

7,751
$228,461

79 T.C. at 403 n.2.
The opinion does not provide the specific calculations to substantiate the IRS's position as
to the amount of the deficiency.
38. The IRS did hold that all costs and attorney fees should be allowed as a deduction.
716 F.2d at 695.

39.
T.C. 398
40.
41.

Brief for Petitioners at 7; Brief for Respondent at 3, Roemer v. Commissioner, 79
(1982).
79 T.C. at 407, 408.
716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
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B.

The Majority Tax Court Opinion

The majority opinion stated that for an individual to be afforded
an exclusion under section 104(a)(2) he must prove "that the
amounts for damages resulted from injury to his personal reputation. ' 42 In addition, they held that a distinction had to be drawn
between harm to an individual's personal and professional reputation.43 Since the court held that the conclusive factor in the determination of whether a damage award is includable in gross income,
pursuant to section 104(a)(2), is the nature of the claim settled,44
the Tax Court ruled that the $290,000 award was taxable because
"the predominant nature of [the petitioner's] 45 claim involved damages to his business and professional reputation as an insurance broker,"'46 and not to his personal reputation. The Tax Court rationalized that the compensatory damages were taxable as ordinary
income 47 because they represented compensation for lost income. 48
Since the compensatory award was not received for a personal injury, the punitive damages, therefore, were similarly taxable as ordinary income.49
The Tax Court determined the nature of the award based on an
42. 79 T.C. at 406 (emphasis in original).
43. Id. at 405.
The majority further stated:
We think the taxation of damages received pursuant to a court judgment in a suit
for injury to a person's reputation, caused by defamatory statements constituting
libel, depends on whether or not such defamation results in injury to the personal

reputation of an individual, as distinguished from libel that injures his business or
professional reputation, to the extent it has affected or may affect his income.

Id. at 405-06.
Although the Roemer court cited Wolfson v. Commissioner, that decision expressly left
open the question as to whether a valid distinction exists between damage to a person's profes-

sional reputation and his personal reputation for purposes of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). 47 T.C.M.
(P-H) T 78,445, at 1860 (1978), affd and remanded, 651 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1981). For a

further discussion of Wolfson, see infra text accompanying notes 247-60.
Even if one assumes that there is a valid distinction, there still remains the question of

whether an award for damages to the former, nonetheless, represents a non-taxable return of
capital.

44. 79 T.C. at 405.
45. The Tax Court only focuses on Mr. Roemer in its opinion and, consequently, the
singular tense is used throughout.

46. 79 T.C. at 406.
47.

This comment will not deal with the other aspect of this case, i.e., whether in the

alternative, the award should be taxed as ordinary income or a capital gain.
48.

79 T.C. at 406.

49.

Id. at 408. The court relied, in part, on an IRS ruling. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B.

47 (once an injury can be considered within the scope of § 104(a)(2), then the entire award is
non-taxable).
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examination of the allegations contained in the petitioner's libel
pleadings as well as the issues and evidence presented at trial." Specifically, Roemer stressed his business losses in the libel suit by
presenting evidence of a $136,000 loss in prospective income. 1 Although the Tax Court noted that during the tax proceeding the pri-

mary emphasis of the petitioner's testimony shifted from damage to
his business reputation to damage to his personal reputation,5 2 it still
considered the testimony in the libel trial to be more accurate and
probative.53 Therefore, the Tax Court held that the petitioner failed
to prove that the compensatory damages were awarded because of a
4
personal injury.
In determining that the punitive damages received were taxable,
the majority reasoned that since "the compensatory damages were
50. 79 T.C. at 406.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 406-07 n.3.
The plaintiff explained at trial that as a result of the defamatory statements made against
him, he lost a chance to form a partnership for the sale of life insurance with another individual and lost the insurance account which depended on the Penn Mutual license he was trying
to acquire. Id. at 406.
53. Id. at 406-07 n.3. The majority concluded "that the predominant nature of his
claims involved damages to his. . .professional reputation as an insurance broker." Id. at 406
(emphasis added). Perhaps, strategically, Roemer should have focused on his personal reputation damage and merely highlighted the extent of that damage by supplying his monetary
losses to the trial court. This would have provided Roemer with a more convincing argument
regarding the personal nature of his claim and possibly have precluded the necessity for the
court to determine how professional reputation damages should be treated for tax purposes.
Furthermore, this argument is buttressed by the Ninth Circuit's decision, wherein it concluded
that the relevant distinction for § 104(a)(2) purposes is between personal and nonpersonal
injuries. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697. Recently, the Tax Court in Church v. Commissioner, Tax
Ct. Rep. (CCH) Dec. No. 40,216, 3373 (June 23, 1983), determined that where a former
Attorney General for Arizona had been defamed by a front page newspaper editorial calling
him a "Communist" the entire award was excludable from gross income. In Church, the IRS
contended that the Tax Court's decision in Roemer mandated a favorable result for the IRS;
the Church court concluded, however, that Roemer was clearly distinguishable. After a review
of the allegations contained in the various complaints, and the evidence and arguments
presented in the state court proceedings, the Church court concluded that "the entire thrust of
petitioner's case was how the libelous editorial affected him personally." Id. at 3375. The compensatory award for $250,000 and the punitive award for $235,000 were to compensate the
petitioner for the "public" embarrassment and humiliation he experienced and the emotional
distress, the pain, and the suffering he underwent upon being labeled a "Communist." Contrasting this situation with that in Roemer, specifically that Church did not allege lost profits,
the court held the award received was for a personal injury - even though a substantial part
"of the award was to compensate [Church] for the loss of a professional career devoted to
politics and public service. ...." Id. at 3376. The court rationalized that the petitioner still
had a career as an attorney and the "shattered dreams, ruined careers, and the mental anguish
that follow are just as personal as, for instance, loss of limb." Id.
54. 79 T.C. at 407.
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intended to reimburse the petitioner for lost profits resulting from
damage to his business reputation, rather than to his personal repu-

tation, [i]t therefore follow[ed] that the punitive damages were [taxable and thus] not awarded 'on account of personal injuries' to the
petitioner." 55
C. The Dissenting Opinions
In his dissent, Judge Forrester5" was perplexed as to the majority's rationale for differentiating between a business reputation and a
personal reputation when, in fact, a reputation is personal by definition. 57 He explained that "[t]he term business or professional reputation does not refer to some intangible other than reputation, generally (or personal reputation)." .

Rather, he asserted that section

104(a)(2) can and should distinguish between libel suits involving an
injury to one's reputation and those involving an injury solely to
one's occupation.59 Judge Forrester suggested several guidelines for
courts to follow in determining the specific nature of the injury:
(1) The statements made, i.e., whether they are directed at the person's character (honesty, personal habits, etc.) or at his occupation
(incompetence, etc.); (2) the geographic area where the statement
is published relative to the taxpayer's business and residence; (3)
the nature of the taxpayer's occupation; (4) the definitional nature
of the action under local law; (5) the relief sought in the complaint;
55. Id. at 408. The court noted that according to California law, punitive damages are
imposed against the defendant to serve as an example and to punish him, and are not directly
related to a plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 408 n.4.
Although the court determined the nature of the claim settled primarily from the fact
that the plaintiff stressed his business losses at trial, that need not be determinative. In Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912, 913 (6th Cir. 1932), the court explained that profits are only one of the major indications of a business' worth. The court stated
that "usual earnings before [an] injury, as compared with those afterward, [are] only an evidentiary factor in determining actual loss and not an independent basis for recovery." State
Fish Corp. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 465, 477 (1967) (the court held that the "element of lost
profits was not an independent basis for recovery but only an evidential factor in determining
actual damage to and diminution of [the business'] good will"). See also Lloyd v. Commissioner, 55 F.2d 842, 844 (7th Cir. 1932) (although defamatory remarks were addressed to
plaintiff's customers and competitors, the court believed that when words are spoken about an
individual's reputation the individual is the one who suffers the injury, not his business). Thus,
despite the fact the plaintiff stressed his business losses, he did so solely to prove damages.
Therefore, the nature of the claim settled could still be a tort-type action covered by §
104(a)(2). See infra text accompanying notes 293-94.
56. 79 T.C. at 411 (Forrester, J., dissenting). Judge Korner joined this dissent.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 411-12 (Forrester, J.,
dissenting).
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(6) the arguments presented to the jury; (7) the classification (if
any) of the damages awarded; and (8) the evidence presented to
the jury.60
Applying these factors to the instant case, he concluded that the
damages awarded to Roemer were for an injury to his reputation
and not to his occupation and, therefore, were non-taxable.61 Additionally, Judge Forrester noted that the petitioner, in stressing his
financial loss at trial, did so merely as a means to show how "his
personal service business, built upon trust, confidence, and honesty,
was financially wounded and nearly destroyed." 62 Finally, he agreed
with the majority's analysis regarding the punitive damages issue,63
but concluded that since the compensatory damages were awarded
as a result of personal injuries and were excludable from gross income, it therefore followed that the punitive damages received would
64
also be non-taxable.
A second dissent, written by Judge Wilbur, represented a compromise between the majority's and Judge Forrester's opinions.
Judge Wilbur agreed with Judge Forrester as to the non-taxable status of the compensatory damages,65 but also strongly agreed with the
majority opinion regarding the taxability of the punitive damages.66
Therefore, since a reputation is personal, it is within the scope of
section 104(a)(2) .67 Judge Wilbur, however, rationalized that punitive damages do not compensate the petitioner "for a loss within the
purview of section 104," and as a result, are non-taxable. 68
Furthermore, he analogized the Roemer fact pattern to a case
where a young surgeon loses a finger and recovers damages which
60. Id.at 412 (Forrester, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 413 (Forrester, J., dissenting).
63. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 55.
64. 79 T.C. at 412 (Forrester, J., dissenting). As will be explained later, see infra notes
288-98 and accompanying text, this end result is desirable, however, the problem is finding and
articulating the specific rationale to justify the conclusion.
65. 79 T.C. at 413 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 414 (Wilbur, J., dissenting). Judge Wilbur reached his conclusion despite his
awareness of a Revenue Ruling which states, in relevant part, that "under section 104(a)(2)
any damages, whether compensatory or punitive, received on account of personal injuries or
sickness are excludable from gross income." Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
67. See 79 T.C. at 414 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
68. Id. Judge Wilbur was unconvinced as to the applicability of the 1975 IRS ruling to
this case. He explained that because those facts are sufficiently different, a contrary result can
be reached. This comment, however, fails to understand his rationale for such a narrow interpretation of the IRS's position. See infra notes 179-203 and accompanying text.
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replaced otherwise taxable future earnings. He explained that the
loss in such a case is not bifurcated into its personal and economic
components and, therefore, the award is non-taxable.6 9 Judge Wilbur
concluded that a similar result should be reached with respect to a
defamation of an individual's reputation, since it is, by definition,
completely personal to the petitioner and according to section
104(a)(2), is not included in gross income.70
D. Ninth Circuit Opinion
In reversing the Tax Court's decision, the Ninth Circuit determined that the dispositive inquiry for section 104(a)(2) involves ascertaining whether the award received is for personal or nonpersonal
injury.71 The Ninth Circuit was extremely disturbed by the Tax
Court's decision in distinguishing between physical and nonphysical
injuries for section 104(a)(2) purposes.72 It felt that this represented
a misinterpretation of the statutory term "personal injury" and
hence was illogical. 73 The Ninth Circuit concluded that a personal
injury is not restricted to a physical manifestation of conduct. 4
Moreover, it emphasized that for the last sixty years even the IRS
has held that certain nonphysical injuries are encompassed under the
statutory exclusion of section 104(a)(2).7
The Ninth Circuit chose to determine the underlying nature of
a defamation suit based solely upon an examination of California
state law. 76 It undertook an historical analysis which reflected the
significant influence that the English treatment of defamation suits
had upon the California statutory scheme at its inception.77 The
Ninth Circuit explained that historically, the principal purpose of a
defamation suit focused on damages to the person defamed, "rather
than the injury which led to the damage. ' 78 Thus, despite this confusion as to the labeling of the cause of action "as one for damages
rather than for an injury," defamation torts were promulgated in
69.

79 T.C. at 414 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).

70.

Id.

71.

716 F.2d at 697.

72.

Id.

73. Id.
74. Id. The Ninth Circuit cites to Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92 (1922) as support for this
position. For a discussion of how subsequent courts have interpreted this IRS opinion, see infra

notes 164-205 and accompanying text.
75. 716 F.2d at 697.
76.

Id.

77. Id. at 697-99
78.

Id. at 698.
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California as part of the regional statutory code under the heading
of "Personal Rights. 7 9 Although their code has been extensively
amended, the defamation tort section has basically remained the
same since 1872.80 Furthermore, California law appropriately differentiated between defamation and disparagement or trade libel and
the mutually exclusive natures of the different suits are easily ascertainable."1 Finally, in quoting from Professor Wigmore, the Ninth
Circuit concluded "that the personal nature of an injury should not
be defined by its effect." 82 Thus, since the entire injury in a defamation suit stems from a personal attack on the individual, a personal
injury for section 104(a)(2) purposes has resulted and thereby makes
the entire award, including punitive damages, non-taxable.
Although the Ninth Circuit reached this correct result, by relying on state law it ignored all relevant federal tax court decisions.
An examination of these decisions would have represented an alternative analysis which could provide other courts with a definitive
statement as to the non-taxable status of defamation awards and
would obviate the need to scrutinize state law in the future. 3
II.

UNDERLYING JUSTIFICATION FOR SECTION

104(a)(2)

Despite minor changes, the substantive language of section
104(a)(2) has essentially remained the same since the time of its
enactment.84 Regardless of this continuity, the legislative history of
the section provides little indication as to whether the provision was
intended to embrace punitive as well as compensatory damages.8 5
Moreover, "[tihe original exemption [for personal injury awards]
was enacted, without legislative history, after the Attorney General
raised the issue whether personal injury awards were 'income' within
the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment."8'
In 1973, one commentator set forth four policy reasons for the
justification of the non-taxable status attributed to awards under sec79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 699.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 699.
Id.

83. See infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 3.
85. The purpose of Part II of this comment is to explore the possible policies behind §
104(a)(2), because the legislative history does not explain the policy behind including compen-

satory damages in this code section.
86. Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 87 n.27 (D. N.J. 1975) (citing 31 Op. Att'y Gen.
304, 308 (1918), vacated on other grounds, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976)).
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tion 104(a)(2). a7 This comment explores two of those policies: (1)
Such awards represent a return of capital which is not includable in
gross income; and (2) while it can be argued that such awards
should be taxable, Congress preferred to confer a humanitarian benefit on the injured party. The latter of these two policies is exempliSee Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax and Non-Tax Policy Considerations,62
L. REV. 701, 704-05 n.29 (1977). Professor Yorio analyzed four possible policy explanations for the predecessor of § 104(a)(2). Since only two of those policies are explored in
the text, the other two are discussed here.
The first policy suggests that compensatory damages for personal injuries were not considered "income" within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment. Yorio explains that the foundation for the Solicitor of Internal Revenue's position was centered on the premise that personal injuries represented an invasion of a non-transferable personal right as opposed to a
property right. Id. at 704 n.27. Furthermore, the IRS explained, because of the very nature of
the right, "there can be no correct estimate of the value of the invaded right [because] [t]he
rights on the one hand and the money on the other are incomparable things which cannot be
placed on opposite sides of an equation." Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922), cited in Yorio,
supra, at 704 nn.26, 27. Consequently, the award received for a personal injury is non-taxable.
The essential problem with this analysis, as Professor Yorio explains. isif a recovery is not "income"-when it is not a gain from labor or capital or from
both combined-then lost profit recoveries [should] arguably [be] excludable since
they represent a gain that failed to materialize because the injured party was prevented from performing services or from engaging in a profitable enterprise ...
Nonetheless, the cases uniformly held that damages for loss of earnings or profits
were taxable ....
Yorio, supra, at 705 (emphasis in original).
This question apparently would not present a problem to the Roemer Tax Court because
the majority believed that if the plaintiff "bring[s] himself squarely within the exclusion from
tax upon which he bases his case, i.e., that the amounts for damages resulted from injury to
his personal reputation," 79 T.C. at 406 (emphasis in original), then even if part of the award
is for "lost profits" it will still be considered non-taxable. This, however, is of little significance
because it merely "begs" the question as to how § 104(a)(2) can be justified.
Despite concluding that defamation to an individual's professional reputation is non-taxable, the Ninth Circuit also did not essentially address the justification for § 104(a)(2). See
infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. Even where the court apparently focused on §
104(a)(2) it improperly applied the Suffered-Enough Concept.
The second policy suggests that damages which represent a periodical return to the injured party do not constitute income. Yorio, supra, at 714-15. The United States Supreme
Court once favored this use. United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189, 195
(1924).
Professor Yorio indicated that this theory had been intelligently criticized: "[I]t may be
concluded with equal logic that the [periodical] receipts should be taxed at an even higher
rate, for the recipient does not depend upon them for subsistence. . . . In addition, no distinction is made between the sporadic income of a prize fighter and the stable income of a college
professor." Yorio, supra, at 715 (quoting Comment, Taxation of Found Property and Other
Windfalls, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 748, 753 (1953)). Professor Yorio also recognizes that "income
bunching" creates difficulties in relation to periodicity and taxation of damage awards. Id. at
716. Finally, in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), the United States
Supreme Court, in rejecting its earlier view, held that punitive damages and other similar
windfalls are taxable income despite the fact that they are not received on a regular basis.
87.

CORNELL
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fled by the notion that because the victim has "suffered enough" as a
result of the original tort, the additional anguish that would be created by the taxation of the award is not justifiable.
Personal Injury Awards Represent a Non-taxable Return of
Capital

A.

1. The Human Body is Considered Capital.-In 1931, the
United. States Supreme Court in Burnet v. Logan,88 adopted the
principle that the recovery of capital was not a taxable event because
it represented a restoration of the value that previously existed.8 9
Therefore, when a person recovers compensation equivalent to his
basis in the asset,90 he is not taxed; any "over compensation," however, is taxable.91 The justification for applying the recovery of capital principle to personal injuries is that the human body or a reputation is a type of "capital. ' 92 Therefore, insurance proceeds or
damages represent a replacement of the capital due to the injury.93
The return of capital theory, however, does not provide a complete
explanation for section 104(a)(2). Punitive damages, although representing an over compensation to its recipient and not merely a return
of capital,59 4 are nevertheless non-taxable when received for personal
9
injuries.
2. Application of Return of Capital Theory to Nonphysical Injury Suits.-Four years before the Supreme Court adopted the return of capital theory in Burnet, the Board of Tax Appeals applied
that analysis to a personal defamation suit in Hawkins v. Commis88. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
89. Id. at 413.
90. Basis is defined as the cost of the property. I.R.C. § 1012 (1976). See § 1016 for
various statutory adjustments to basis. I.R.C. § 1016 (1976).

91.

This approach is similar to the explanation that an award is not "income" within the

meaning of the sixteenth amendment because if the right is inestimatable then the recovery is
equal to its basis and no gain is realized. See Cutler, Taxation of the Proceeds of Litigation,
57 COLUM. L. REV. 470 (1957). Once it has been determined that the award is taxable then

the next issue is whether the excess over basis should be taxed as ordinary income or as a
capital gain, especially when an intangible asset such as goodwill is involved. Since this analysis is beyond the scope of this comment, see Yorio, supra note 87, at 709-10 and Cutler, supra

at 473 for further amplification of this point.
92.

See Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71, 72 (1920), where the IRS, although relying on an

earlier Attorney General opinion dated June 27, 1918 to conclude that the human body is a
form of capital, distinguished alienation of a spouse's affection and held such an award to be

outside the scope of § 104(a)(2) and therefore taxable.
93. Id. at 71-72.
94. See supra note 55.
95. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
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sioner9 In that case, the petitioner, an industrial engineer and the
president of the C. L. Best Gas Traction Company, was removed
from his position.9 Officers of the company,' subsequently "published
defamatory statements about him." 98 Hawkins originally filed suit
demanding one million dollars for injury to his reputation, business,
and health. An out of court settlement, however, was eventually
reached. 99 Subsequently, the IRS filed a deficiency notice against
Hawkins with respect to this matter. The petitioner then brought
suit to establish that the settlement award was non-taxable.100 The
Hawkins court held that compensation for defamation to a person's
reputation is not taxable because "[ilt is an attempt to make the
plaintiff whole as before the injury."101 The court determined that
the "compensation [in the form of] general damages adds nothing to
the individual, for the very concept which sanctions it prohibits that
it shall include a profit. 10 2
In McDonald v. Commissioner,10 3 which was also decided prior
to Burnet, Mrs. McDonald had previously recovered a judgment of
$40,000 in a suit against Mr. DesPortes for breach of his promise to
marry her. 104 In deciding whether the award was taxable, the Board
of Tax Appeais concluded that damages for breach of a promise to
marry were non-taxable.105 The McDonald court stated that "the decisions to which we have reference and the principles to be considered are set forth in the opinion adopted by the Board in Hawkins v.
Commissioner, and we are content to rest our decision in this proceeding upon the discussion in that case." 10 6 Presumably, the court
analogized the award received by Mrs. McDonald to that which was
96.

6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927), acq. 7-1 C.B. 14 (1928). The court also based its decision on

the fact that the recovery is not income. Id. at 1024.
97.
98.

Id. at 1023.
Id.

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.at 1025.
102. Id.; cf. Durkee v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1947) ("where the settlement represents damages for lost capital rather than for lost profits the money received is a
return of capital and not taxable." Id. at 186 (citations omitted)). See Raytheon Prod. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944) (The fact, "that the
recovery represents a return of capital in that it takes the place of the business good will is not
to conclude that it may not contain a taxable benefit." Id. at 114. One must still present
evidence of the adjusted basis of the good will to help alleviate taxation. Id.)
103. 9 B.T.A. 1340, acq. 7-2 C.B. 26 (1928).

104. Id.
105. Id. at 1342.
106.

Id.
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authorized in Hawkins, consequently determining that the money re,ceived was a return of capital which only made the plaintiff/petitioner whole. Specifically, the jury was entitled to award damages to
compensate her for "mortification and pain or distress of mind,...
loss of social standing, . . . injury to future prospects of marriage,

.. . loss of benefits which [she] might have derived from the [marriage] including loss of station . . . and loss of a permanent home
and worldly advantages .... "I"
In 1974, the IRS subsequently determined that, under section
104(a)(2), damages for alienation of affection and for surrender of
custody of a minor child were excludable from gross income.10 8 The
IRS explained that "[n]one of the amounts constituted exemplary or
punitive damages." 1 09 Arguably, the IRS considered the awards as
compensatory and, therefore, applied a return of capital analysis in
this nonphysical injury suit. Thus, although the return of capital theory has been applied in cases involving section 104(a)(2) and its
predecessors, the absence of a justification for the non-taxable status
of punitive damages-which is by definition, over compensationresults in the conclusion that this theory is inadequate to explain section 104(a)(2).
B. A Suffered-Enough Concept

The Suffered-Enough Concept

10

involves conferring a humani-

107. Id. at 1341; cf.Meyer v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. Tenn. 1959). The
taxpayer received $2500 from a movie company in connection with the filming of a movie
which appeared to depict the plaintiff as manager of a baseball team. The taxpayer sought
refund of this money, claiming it "was paid in settlement of injuries to his personal reputation
and for invasion . . . of privacy." Id. at 921. The court held that the plaintiff was not damaged, but the court noted that, had an actual invasion of privacy been followed by compensation, then the award would be completely non-taxable. Id. at 923-24. The court cited both
Hawkins and Ehrlich in reaching its conclusion. In Ehrlich v. Higgins, 52 F. Supp. 805
(S.D.N.Y. 1943), the taxpayer received $42,500 in consideration for consent to use her name
and specific personal correspondence with respect to a proposed film biography of her late
husband. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the payments were actually received for
violation of her right of privacy and thus non-taxable, because the evidence presented in court
did not disclose that any wrong had been perpetrated. Id. at 808. The court did express the
view that it would distinguish between a case where damage occurs followed by payment and
where a legal right was surrendered for consideration. Id.; see generally Fouts, supra note 9, at
559-60 (analysis of non-taxable status of an award for invasion of privacy).
108. Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33.
109. Id.
110. See Harnett, supra note 25, at 627. Professor Bertram Harnett was the first to
suggest the notion of a Suffered-Enough Concept. Harnett contends that the personal injury
exemption stems, in part, from the feeling "that the taxation of recoveries carved from pain
and suffering is offensive, and the victim is more to be pitied rather than taxed." Id.
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tarian benefit on the victim. This comment posits that this concept
addresses the unique characteristics of the personality of a human
being and stresses that the law governing man should be attuned to
those qualities. The personality l"' of a human being can be described
as having two essential qualities: a logical thought process and an
emotional responsive process. 1 As a result of an interplay between
these two processes, an individual is able to communicate with
society.11
The American legal system was established to "insure domestic
[t]ranquility, provide for the common defence [and] promote the
general [w]elfare .
,,.Recognizing the enormously strong emotional desires of mankind, the founding fathers incorporated a system of checks and balances to safeguard against the abuse of
power. 5 The judicial and legislative systems today have also been
responsive to the emotional component of an individual and have

manifested this humanitarian understanding by adopting the Suffered-Enough Concept. 1 6
1. Judicial Recognition of the Suffered-Enough Concept.-In
1975, the New Jersey District Court decided Huddell v. Levin,"'
determining that the provisions for the personal injury exemption in

the IRS Code were "intended to relieve a taxpayer who has the misfortune to become ill or injured" 1 8 of the need to pay income tax.

Therefore, if the award received was taxable, then the congressional
111. For an interesting discussion of the interests represented in a personality, see
Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REv. 445 (1915).
112. "A personality is a dynamic whole that is defined by the distinctive structural at-

tributes of the self." H.

SMITH, PERSONAUTY DEVELOPMENT

8 (2d ed. 1974). See generally id.

at 93-118 (analysis of the emotional composition of an individual); J. COLEMAN, CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EFFECTIVE BEHAVIOR,

375-95 (4th ed. 1979) (analysis of emotions).

It has also been said that every waking hour is filled with one's own thoughts and with emotions that only he can experience first hand. Id. at 48.
113. See generally H. SMITH, supra note 112; J. COLEMAN, supra note 112.
114. U.S. CONST. preamble.
115. See generally Note, The Framer's Intent and the Early Years of the Republic, 11
HOFSTRA L. REv. 413, 423-28 (1982) (contains interesting factual support from various state
conventions).
116. See infra notes 117-44 and accompanying text.
117. 395 F. Supp. 64 (D. N.J. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir.
1976).
118. Id. at 87 (quoting Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 1952)).
The full Epmeier quote, "[tihe provisions of Section 22(b)(5) undoubtedly were intended to
relieve a taxpayer who has the misfortune to become ill or injured, of the necessity of paying
income tax upon insurance benefits received to combat the ravages of disease or accident," was
cited with approval in Haynes v. United States, 353 U.S. 81, 84 n.3 (1957). See also Norfolk
& W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 501 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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intent of section 104(a)(2) and its predecessors to extend a tax benefit to an injured party would be nullified.11 9 Furthermore, the Huddell court concluded that
[it] can devine no societal purpose that would be furthered by
awarding wrong-doing defendants with the benefit of this Congressional largesse. A societal purpose would be served by benefiting
innocent victims of tortious conduct. . . .This court therefore concludes that Congress, as with all exemptions under Section 104,
".. . intended to relieve a taxpayer who has the misfortune to become ill or injured .... 120

In Norfolk & Western Railway v. Liepelt,121 a wrongful death
action brought pursuant to the Federal Employees' Liability Act
("FELA"), the United States Supreme Court held that evidence was
admissable to show the effect of income taxes on the victim's estimated future earnings. In addition, it held that a jury instruction
explaining that taxes should not be considered in determining the
amount of the award was proper.1 22 Although this suit did not require an analysis of the justification for IRC section 104(a)(2), 23
the dissent argued that by mandating a reduction of a damage
award "for federal income taxes that would have been paid by the
119. See Huddell, 395 F. Supp. at 87-88.
120. Id. at 87 (quoting Epemier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 1952),
quoted In Haynes v. United States, 353 U.S. 81, 84 (1957)). The Huddell court continued its
analysis and determined that "the New Jersey Supreme Court would recognize the intended
benefit of the Congressional exemption, under the 'Collateral source' doctrine." Id. at 88. This
doctrine provides that benefits received by the victim due to a "contract, employment, or other
relation cannot operate to reduce the damages recoverable against a tortfeasor." Id. Even a
commentator who is generally critical of the "Collateral source" doctrine has recognized the
special applicability of the doctrine to benefits created by legislation: "
"Whatever the logical difficulties of denying mitigation for collateral benefits in a
system of damages which is primarily compensatory, Congress and the state legislatures may make a considered decision that particular benefits are to be additional to
an injured party's other remedies. Where such legislative intent is ascertainable,
mitigation is, of course, [im]proper. Since 1939, the Internal Revenue Code may
have reflected such a policy choice, damages recoverable for loss of earnings being
expressly excluded from gross income."
Id. at 88 n.33 (quoting Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages - the CollateralSource Rule,
77 HARv. L. REV. 741, 752 (1964)).
If the tax savings were deducted, then Congress' intent to confer a benefit upon the plaintiff would be nullified by shifting it to the defendant. Dixie Feed & Seed Co v. Byrd, 52 Tenn.
App. 619, 627-28, 376 S.W.2d 745, 749 (1963) (citation omitted). See Recent Cases, 69
HARv. L. REV. 1495, 1497 (1956); Huddell, 395 F. Supp. at 88.
121. 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
122. Id.
123. The issue did not center around the taxability of the award.
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decedent on his earnings, the Court appropriates for the tortfeasor a
benefit intended to be conferred on the victim or his survivors. 1 24
Furthermore, the dissent quoted from the aforementioned passage in
Huddell,12 5 as a possible explanation for Congress' decision in section 104(a)(2) to express its humane desire not to burden the already injured.12 6
The majority in Norfolk took note of the dissent's position and
explained that they "see nothing in the language and are aware of
nothing in the legislative history of § 104(a)(2) to suggest that it has
any impact whatsoever on the proper measure of damages in a
wrongful-death action."1 27 The majority opinion is correct in its
analysis because neither the language in section 104(a)(2) nor its
legislative history necessarily indicates any justification for the Code
section. 128 Nevertheless, if the court had focused its attention on the
established case law under section 104(a)(2)-involving both physical and nonphysical personal injury awards coupled with the widespread use of the Suffered-Enough Concept in the Code-then it
might have reached the same conclusion about section 104(a)(2) as
the dissent. Moreover, "given the [long history] of Congressional in129
action in the face of clarifying opinions throughout the nation,"
"the 'continued presence of the exemption in the tax code appears to
indicate that Congress intended to benefit injured persons by relieving them of the necessity of paying a tax.' 1s3
In applying the Suffered-Enough Concept, the circuit court in
Roemer 3 1 determined that the injured party should not be burdened
with having to sort out the taxable and non-taxable components of a
lump sum award. 13 2 The court's view represents a narrow interpretation of the Suffered-Enough Concept. It is possible that in applying
the court's interpretation to a situation where the award is allocated
into its various components, the court would conclude that part of
the award is taxable, since no additional administrative burden
124. Norfolk, 444 U.S. at 498-99.
125. 395 F. Supp. at 87; see supra text accompanying note 110.
126. Norfolk, 444 U.S. at 501.
127. Id. at 496 n.10.
128. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
129. Huddell, 395 F. Supp. at 88 n.30. Cf. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
130. Huddell, 395 F. Supp. at 87-88 n.30 (quoting Recent Cases, 69 HARV. L. Rav.
supra note 120, at 1496).
131. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
132. Id. at 696 (citation omitted).
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would be placed on the petitioner.133 Therefore, the Suffered-Enough
Concept should instead be understood as a blanket policy explanation, substantiating the fact that for humanitarian purposes the injured party will receive a tax-free award.
2. Other IRC Sections Have Adopted the Suffered-Enough
Concept.-The IRC has promulgated other sections creating special
exceptions for taxpayers in difficult or special circumstances.134 For
example, according to section 1033(a)(1), "[i]f property (as a result
of its destruction in whole or in part, theft, seizure, or requisition or
condemnation or threat or imminence thereof) is compulsorily or involuntarily converted. .
135

.

. [i]nto property similar.

. .

no gain shall

be recognized."
Generally, proceeds of life insurance contracts
payable by reason of death are not taxable.1 36 Individuals who have
obtained the age of 65 can often take a fifteen percent credit against
their regular tax liability.13 7 In addition, amounts received under accident and health plans are generally excludable from gross income. 138 These situations should represent taxable income under the
IRC. Congress, however, has found it desirable "to temper the general policy 139' and allow an exception for a taxpayer victimized by
illness or injury, "140 uncontrollable circumstance, or merely old age.
Despite the broad exercise of its income taxing power,141 Congress
has shown great solicitude for the protection of the human body and
its attributes and has attempted to mitigate the hardship caused by
death or injury.
In view of the judicially interpreted Congressional intent for
section 104(a)(2), 42 it is not surprising that the Ninth Circuit in
Roemer-despite its reliance on state law-held that the entire
award received by the petitioner was excludable from gross in133. Contrast this potential situation with Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47 which alleviates the problems of allocating a general award into the categories of lost profit and pain and
suffering, by concluding that a personal injury award is entirely non-taxable. Furthermore,
according to Professor Yorio, the exemption for § 104(a)(2) "cannot be justified solely on the
grounds of administrative convenience." Yorio, supra note 87, at 709.
134. For a list of additional exemptions, see Phillips, supra note 3, at 925-26.
135. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(1).
136. I.R.C. § 101(a)(1).
137.
138.
139.

I.R.C. § 37 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
I.R.C. §§ 105-106 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

140. Phillips, supra note 3, at 926.
141. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (citations omitted)
(The Supreme Court stated that Congress exerted the "full measure of its taxing power" in
enacting the statutory definition for "gross income").
142. See supra notes 117-33 and accompanying text.
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come.'"3 This treatment is consistent with, and furthers an already
established and prevalent policy, that "the victim is more to be pitied
144
rather than taxed.
C. Defamation Awards
The primary interest at issue in all defamation suits is admittedly the reputation of the defamed plaintiff.14 5 The case law in this
area is designed "to protect [a person's] reputation rather than [his]
' 146
dignity, self-esteem [character,] or mental equanimity.
In its vital aspect, the right to [a] reputation is not concerned with
fame or distinction. It has regard, not to intellectual or other special acquirements, but [concerns] that repute which is slowly built
up by integrity, honorable conduct, and right living. One's good
name is therefore as truly the product of one's efforts as any physical possession; indeed, it alone gives to material possessions their
1 47
value as sources of happiness.
Reputation is thus what a person appears to be.1 48 It results
from observations of an individual's conduct-"the character imputed to him by others."' 49 Furthermore, it is something which is
intrinsic as well as intangible and yet is a very valuable personal
asset.1 50 It has been said, that "[a] good name is rather to be chosen
than great riches [and a] good reputation, when based on sound
character, is a man's most precious possession.1' 15 1 Moreover, since
credit is an integral facet of contemporary society, the confidence
that one has in his fellowmen as manifested through an individual's
1 52
reputation is invaluable.
Thus, the idea that a man may defame a business associate and
143. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 700.
144. Harnett, supra note 25, at 627.
145. Grant v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733, 734 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 797 (1945).
146. Wade, Tort Liabilityfor Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REV. 63, 79
(1950).
147. Van Vechter Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation. II, 4
COLUM. L. REV. 33, 33 (1904).
148. Id.

149. Id.
150. See L. ELDREDGE, supra note 14, at 2.
151. Roth v. Greensboro News Co., 217 N.C. 13, 20, 6 S.E.2d 882, 887 (1940); accord
Sweet v. Post Publishing Co., 215 Mass. 450, 455, 102 N.E. 660, 662 (1913) ("But the right
of the private citizen to be secure in his reputation always must remain one of the most sacred
of rights").
152. See L. ELDREDGE, supra note 14, at 10-11.
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restrict the false charge to that individual's professional reputation is
delusive. As a result, the Roemer Tax Court's attempt to distinguish,
for tax purposes, between an individual's personal reputation and
professional reputation was premised on fallacious reasoning. The
difference becomes meaningless when one focuses on the irreparable
nature of a reputation, the anguish suffered by the victim, and the
policy underlying153section 104(a)(2)-it is better to pity the victim
than to tax him.
III.

THE Roemer

TAX COURT MISINTERPRETED PRIOR CASE

LAW

This section focuses on an historic analysis of the tax treatment

of defamation awards. The comment then applies these results to the
Roemer Tax Court case and concludes, as the Ninth Circuit held,,""
that the entire award is excludable from gross income. This analysis
is necessary because of the narrow grounds upon which the Ninth
Circuit decided the case. The circuit court held that Roemer's award
was excludable from gross income under section 104(a)(2) by analyzing whether he suffered a personal injury as determined under
California state law.155 The court explained that historically California has considered defamation law as an infringement of "a general
personal right. ' 156 It is therefore distinguishable from trade libel or
disparagement which consist of an attack on an individual's product
or services.1 57 The court concluded that the defamation of an individ153. Harnett, supra note 25, at 627.
154. Roemer, 716 F.2d 693.
155. Id. at 700.
156. Id. at 699. California defamation statutes appear in the Civil Code Section of the
Statutory Code under the heading of Personal Rights. CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 44-48.5 (West
1982).
157. 716 F.2d at 699. The Ninth Circuit, relying on California law, easily distinguished
the tax consequences of defamation to an individual and trade libel. Id. The former concerns
the person of the plaintiff, while the latter involves only the plaintiffs goods. Id. Therefore,
defamation is a personal injury and the award received is non-taxable, whereas an award for
trade libel would be taxable.
The court's approach is problematic for two reasons: (1) It does not indicate how a court
should deal with a situation where a lump sum award is received for both defamation and
trade libel and (2) in some jurisdictions, like the State of Washington, clear distinctions are
not made in the statutory application of the defamation and trade libel torts. It is possible that
both causes of action can be brought pursuant to the Washington Statute. "Every malicious
publication ...

which shall tend

. . .

to injure any person, corporation or association of per-

sons in his or their business or occupation, shall be libel." WASH. REy. CODE ANN.
§9.58.010(3) (1977). Cf. Waechter v. Carnation Co., 5 Wash. App. 121, 126-27, 485 P.2d
1000, 1004 (1971) (an action can be brought for defamation and trade libel, however, the
latter is only recoverable if special damages are proven). Therefore, judicial determination of
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ual's personal and professional reputations are equivalent for tax
purposes because "all of the harm that is done
flows from the same
15 8
personal attack on the defamed individual.

In Lyeth v. Hoey,159 however, the United States Supreme Court
held that
[when] dealing with the meaning and application of an act of Congress

. . .

to tax income and to grant exemptions from that tax, it

is the will of Congress which controls, and the expression of its will,
in the absence of language evidencing a different purpose, should
be interpreted "so as to give a uniform application to a nationwide
scheme of taxation." Congress establishes its own criteria and the
state law may control only when the federal taxing act by express
language or necessary implication makes its operation dependent
upon state law.160
Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined in Morgan v. Commissioner,""1 that although state law creates legal rights and interests, it
is the federal revenue acts that designate which will be taxable and
non-taxable.16 2 Once this classification has been made, "the federal

law must prevail no matter what name is given to the interest or
right by state law."16 3 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit should have incorporated an analysis of the relevant federal tax decisions involving
defamation awards. Such a discussion would have set forth the federal Tax Court's position on defamation awards and would have
helped to prevent future courts from making the same mistakes the
Roemer Tax Court committed in interpreting the federal case law in
this area.
A.

The 1922 IRS Opinion and Its Progeny

The IRS determined in 1922 that damages awarded for the lithe nature of the award becomes a tedious and quite perplexing administrative inconvenience.
158. 716 F.2d 700.
159. 305 U.S. 188 (1938).
160. Id. at 194 (citation omitted).
161. 309 U.S. 78 (1939).
162. Id. at 80-81.
163. Id. at 81. See Estate of Sovenson v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1180 (1979) (citing
Morgan, 309 U.S. 78 (1939)); see also Estate of Burgess v. Commissioner, 622 F.2d 700, 703
(4th Cir. 1980) (applying federal law in determining a federal tax question, although redistribution of decedent's property was directed by a state court presumably following state law); cf.
Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666, 670 (2d Cir. 1965) (where the court determined that certainty and uniformity are important goals of the federal tax scheme. Therefore,
the court validated the couple's divorce and concluded that the prior payments of the husband
to his spouse were property deductible as alimony).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:211

bel or slander of an individual were non-taxable.164 The IRS stated
that one of its earlier opinions, published before the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Eisner v. Macomber,165 "may have been correct in holding that damages received by a lawyer for libel of his
professional reputation constitute income. Business libel may be distinguished from ordinary defamation of character and is not here
under consideration." 6 ' The opinion reiterated that "[s]lander or libel affecting business reputation or property rights, however, are not
considered in this opinion. 167 The IRS thus chose to narrow the
scope of its decision by leaving unanswered the question concerning
the tax consequences of an award resulting from defamation to an
individual's professional reputation.
In Hawkins v. Commissioner,'" the Board of Tax Appeals held
that compensatory damages received in a settlement for libel and
slander to an individual's reputation and health are not income.1 69
The Hawkins court did not distinguish for tax purposes between an
individual's personal and business reputation.17 No suggestion was
made that special, exemplary, or punitive damages were paid to the
plaintiff; as the court noted, "we need not consider the law as to
them."1
Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Commissioner17 2 involved the

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland's unfair business practices
which impaired the reputation of the Farmers' & Merchants' Bank
("Bank"). The Bank consequently suffered a loss of depositors and
income and initiated a suit which resulted in a favorable settlement. 173 The Bank's award was considered to be non-taxable since
164. Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92 (1922).
165. 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (where the Court defined income as "the gain derived
from capital, from labor, or from both combined").
166. Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. at 93.
167. Id. at 94.
168. 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927), acq. 8-1 C.B. 14 (1928).
169. Id. at 1024-25. For an analysis of the court's rationale, see supra text accompany-

ing notes 83-88. The court did state that "[i]f compensation for the loss of a life is not taxable
as income unless expressly provided, [then] compensation for the injury to personal reputation
should similarly require an express provision." Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1025.
170. The court explained that the compensation paid was the only remedy permitted by
law for an injury "wholly personal and nonpecuniary" in its nature. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at
1024; see Plumb, Income Tax on Gains and Losses in Litigation,25 CORNELL L. Q. 221, 234

n.80; Yorio, supra note 87, at 707 n.47.
171. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1024.
172. 59 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1932).
173. Id. at 913. The Reserve Bank paid the plaintiff $18,750, however, the expense of
the suit was subsequently deducted. Id.
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the court resolved that it could "see no legal distinction between
compensation for destruction of or damage to incorporeal or intangible property, such as good will, and similar compensation for damage to tangible property. 1 7 4 Therefore, the payment was a return of
capital" 5 and did not constitute income.17 6
This represented the first time the courts grappled with a problem involving an injury to a business reputation and held the award
to be non-taxable."" The Farmers' court, however, did not have to
address the question of whether a distinction existed or could be
made between a personal and business reputation because a bank
178
can only have the latter, since it is not a human being.
In 1955, the United States Supreme Court declared, in the
landmark case of Commissionerv. Glenshaw Glass Co.,

income. 80

79

that puni-

tive damages were includable in gross
Glenshaw Glass
Company ("Glenshaw"), a Pennsylvania manufacturer of glass bottles and containers was engaged in lengthy litigation with the Hartford-Empire Company ("Hartford"). 1 Glenshaw claimed, inter
alia, "exemplary damages for fraud and treble damages for injury to
its business by reason of Hartford's violation of the federal antitrust
laws." 1 82 The plaintiff received a settlement of approximately
$800,000.18a The Commissioner filed a deficiency notice for the entire sum less deductible legal fees. ' The Supreme Court, in holding
174. Id. at 913.
175. Knickerbocker, The Income Tax Treatment of Damages: A Study in the Difficulties of the Income Concept, 47 CORNELL L. Q. 429, 434 (1962); see supra notes 76-105 and
accompanying text.
176. For an interesting analysis of this case, see Harnett, supra note 25, at 629-30.
177. See Knickerbocker, supra note 175, at 434.
178. See El Meson Espanol v. Nym Corp., 521 F.2d 737, 739 (2d. Cir. 1975); Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. American Fed'n of Labor & Congress of Indus. Orgs., 215 Cal. App. 2d
560, 571, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (1963); see also Church of Scientology of Calif. v. Siegelman, 475 F. Supp. 950, rearg.denied, 481 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (religious organization, although considered an association and not an individual, can bring suit for defamation);
Golden Palace, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1974), affd
per curiam, 530 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (corporation does not have a personal reputation
and can only be defamed by attacking its financial soundness or business ethics); Ajay Nutrition Foods, Inc. v. Food and Drug Administration, 378 F. Supp. 210 (D.N.J. 1974), affd per
curiam, 513 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1975) (entire industry, such as health food industry, cannot sue
for defamation).
179. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
180. Id. at 428.
181. Id. at 427.
182. Id. at 427-28.
183. Id. at 428.
184. Id.
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that the award was taxable stated:
Here we have instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.
The mere fact that the payments were extracted from the wrongdoers as punishment for unlawful conduct cannot detract from their
character as taxable income to the recipients. Respondents concede, as they must, that the recoveries are taxable to the extent
that they compensate for damages actually incurred. It would be
an anomaly that could not be justified in the absence of clear congressional intent to say that a recovery for actual damages is taxable but not the additional amount extracted as punishment for the
same conduct which caused the injury. And we find no such evidence of intent to exempt these payments. 85
The Supreme Court did take note of the inapplicability of its
holding to personal injury cases. In a footnote the Supreme Court
declared:
The long history of departmental rulings holding personal injury
recoveries non-taxable on the theory that they roughly correspond
to a return of capital canmot support exemption of punitive damages following injury to property. Damages for personal injury are
by definition compensatory only. Punitive damages, on the other
hand, cannot be considered a restoration of capital for taxation
purposes. 88
Subsequently, in 1958, the IRS ruled in the settlement of a libel
suit for injury to personal reputation, that only the compensatory
award was non-taxable and that the punitive award was includable
in the plaintiff's gross income. 1 87 The IRS relied on Hawkins'88 for
excluding the compensatory award' 89 and interestingly cited Glenshaw Glass as support for taxing the punitive award. 190 The IRS
185. Id. at 431.
186. Id. at 432 n.8 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
187. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18. This ruling, which relied on the 1922 IRS Opinion, see supra notes 164, 166-67 and accompanying text, declared that if the defamatory statements injured the petitioner's business or professional reputation, a taxable award would result
to the extent that his income was affected by those statements. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B.
at 19.
The problem with this analysis is that (I) the IRS in 1922 only alluded to the fact that
damages to a professional reputation may be taxable, see supra text accompanying note 166,
and (2) the 1958 ruling fails to explain why that should be the proper tax treatment of an
award for professional defamation.
188. 6 B.T.A. 1023.
189. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. at 19.
190. Id.
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extracted from Glenshaw Glass the principle that an award "received [for] exemplary and punitive damages from wrongdoers as
punishment for their unlawful conduct9 1did not detract from their
character as income to the recipients.'
The IRS' interpretation of the Supreme Court's analysis of punitive damages received for a personal injury in Glenshaw Glass is,
however, questionable. This writer believes that a proper interpretation of Glenshaw Glass encompasses the following: (1) the Supreme
Court only determined that compensatory awards received for personal injury were non-taxable and (2) punitive damages awarded for
injury to property were taxable. The Court did not determine the
taxable status of punitive damages received for a personal injury.
The justification for this position is based upon an analysis of the
aforementioned footnote in Glenshaw Glass,9 2 the IRS opinion in
1958,11 and its subsequent reversal in 1975. °4
In 1955, the Glenshaw Glass Court was under the assumption
that a return of capital theory proffered in departmental rulings regarding personal injury awards could not "support exemption of punitive damages following injury to property.' 95 The Supreme Court
apparently did not address the treatment of punitive damages in the
personal injury context. The Court continued to explain that, by definition, personal injury damages are compensatory. 96 In basing its
decision on a return of capital theory, the Supreme Court was compelled to hold that personal injury awards are only compensatory,
because otherwise, there would be no explanation for the award's
non-taxable status.
In concluding that "[p]unitive damages . . . cannot be considered a restoration of capital for taxation purposes,"' 97 the Supreme
Court was arguably addressing the personal injury situation. Therefore, although it describes a personal injury award as being compensatory, it did not exclude the possibility that a punitive award for
personal injury would also be non-taxable. Thus, the purpose of the
footnote-although admittedly ambiguous-was to distinguish between awards received for personal injury and for property damages.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
348 U.S. at 432 n.8; see supra text accompanying note 186.
Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18.
Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.

195. 348 U.S. at 432 n.8 (citations omitted).
196.

Id.

197.

Id.
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In 1958,118 when the IRS ruled that punitive damages awarded

for personal injury were taxable,19 it apparently applied the return
of capital theory as set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in
Glenshaw Glass. 00 Consequently, since punitive damages do not
make the plaintiff/petitioner whole, they are taxable. In 1975, however, the IRS-contrary to its 1958 ruling-determined that punitive damages were also non-taxable when received for personal injury.2 Arguably, in so doing the IRS was willing to concede that
the exclusion contained in section 104(a)(2) could not be explained
through the use of ordinary logical principles. Thus, the only justification for this Code section is a humane desire not to burden those
already injured. 20 2 "Therefore, . . . any damages, whether compensatory or punitive, received on account of personal injuries or sickness are excludable from gross income."2 3 This ruling is consistent
with the foregoing interpretation of the Supreme Court's view as expressed in Glenshaw Glass as it bifurcates the tax treatment of punitive awards for personal and property damages.
With this explanation for the development of the non-taxable
status of punitive damages explicated, this comment now focuses its
attention on a series of three cases-Agar v. Commissioner,'"s
Knuckles v. Commissioner,20 5 and Draper v. Commissioner2 08which the Roemer Tax Court erroneously relied upon.
In Agar, the plaintiff entered into a five-year employment contract as treasurer of the Daniger Corporation. 0 The corporation
had previously retained Agar's services as an accountant for many
years. 20 His contract provided for "a fixed annual salary of $35,000,
payable in equal weekly installments, ' 20 9 and included a special
"percentage compensation" profit-sharing plan.210 The contract fur198.

Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18.

199. Id. at 19.
200. See id.
201. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
202.

See supra notes 110-44 and accompanying text.

203. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47. This ruling has not been subsequently questioned.
204.

Agar v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 116 (1960), affd, 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir.

1961). For an analysis of the Agar case, see Comment, Tax Treatment of Post-Termination
Personal Injury Settlements, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1237, 1246-48 (1973).
205. 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 182 (1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1965). For an analysis of the Knuckles decision, see Comment, supra note 204, at 1248-49.
206. 26 T.C. 201 (1956).

207. Agar, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) at 117.
208. Id. at 116.
209. Id. at 117.
210.

Id.
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ther provided that if Agar was removed for cause, he would not be
entitled to receive any "unpaid 'fixed' or 'percentage' compensation. ' 211 After commencement of his duties as treasurer, the plaintiff
realized that the company had lost confidence in him.212 His health
subsequently deteriorated because of the loss of respect as well as
the hurried pace of his office. 213 After a little more than a year, Agar
resigned. 21 4 Agar informed the company that he was going to sue for
injuries resulting from the mistreatment by company personnel and,
consequently, a $45,000 settlement was negotiated. 1
Agar claimed that, according to Hawkins v. Commissioner,216
and the 1922 IRS opinion,21 these payments constituted compensatory damages for injury to his personal reputation and health, and as
a result were non-taxable.21 8 On appeal, the Second Circuit stated:
The commissioner's rejection of this position[2191was upheld by
the Tax Court on two grounds: first, that the payments were in the
nature of severance pay or extra compensation and not in settlement of a possible tort action; second, that even if in settlement of

a tort claim the gravamen of that claim was an injury to business
reputation and thus the taxpayer could not rely on the statutory
exemption of payments on account of 'personal injuries.' Since we
affirm upon the first ground, we do not have to decide whether
whatever tort claim Agar may have asserted was based upon damage to his personal as well as his business reputation, assuming that
the dichotomy is realistic, and whether all payments or a portion of
them would therefore be tax exempt.220
It should be noted that the Agar court adopted the same narrow
approach used by the IRS in 1922.221 Neither authority stated that a
discernible distinction could be made between an individual's personal and professional reputation nor addressed the issue of whether
222
an award for the latter would be taxable.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 118. The amount was to be paid in three equal payments. Id.
216. 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927), acq. 7-1 C.B. 14 (1928).
217. Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92 (1922).
218. 19 T.C.M. (CCH) at 119.
219. The court of appeals labeled Agar's claim as one for slander. 290 F.2d at 284 n.l.
220. Id. at 284 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
221. Sol. Op. 132, 1-1C.B. 92 (1922). See supra text accompanying notes 164-67.
222. Perhaps Agar might have been more successful had he used Farmers' Merchants'
Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1932), as support. See supra text accompanying
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Four years later, in Knuckles, theTenth Circuit similarly upheld
a Tax Court opinion that an award to the petitioner was taxable
because it was not made in settlement of his personal injury claim,
but rather, represented compensation due him under his employment
contract.223 The court accepted the Tax Court's finding that the tort
claim was not part of the settlement negotiations, since the claim
was merely an afterthought brought into being by the possible tax
advantage that might ensue.224 The court focused on the "intent of
the payor" to establish the purpose of the payment. 25
The Tax Court in Knuckles,22 6 explained that although there
was proof that the petitioner's "business reputation had suffered because of his experience with [his employer,] Perpetual [Life Insurance Company,] that fact militate[d] against him. '227 The Tax
Court cited Draperand Hawkins v. Commissioner 28 as support for
its position. 229 It is interesting to note that Hawkins, as has been
previously discussed, 230 did not address the question of whether an
award for injury to an individual's professional reputation was taxable. Furthermore, in Draper the sole issue was whether the petitioner's expenditure for counsel fees in a libel action for damage to
his professional reputation was deductible for tax purposes. 21 Although the libel suit was tried, the jury failed to reach a final verdict. Due to a lack of funds, the petitioner was unable to retry the
case. 23 2 The Tax Court did hold, however, that the legal fees were
deductible since they represented an ordinary and necessary business
expense.233
The Draper court's decision regarding the deductibility aspect
of the legal expenses incurred does not represent a conclusive statement that an award received for defamation of an individual's pronotes 172-76.
223. 349 F.2d at 612. The Tax Court also found that part of the settlement was for

damage to Knuckles' business reputation. Id.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 613.
Id.
23 T.C.M. (CCH) 182 (1964).
Id. at 185.
6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927), acq. 7-1 C.B. 14 (1928).
Knuckles, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) at 185.
See supra text accompanying notes 96-102.
26 T.C. at 204. Cf. Kleinschmidt v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 921, 921 (1949) (legal

fees to prosecute a libel suit to recoup damages for injury to "personal reputation and good
name 'as a citizen, lawyer, banker, and a churchman'" did not constitute deductible ordinary

and necessary expenses of carrying on his trade or business).
232.
233.

Draper, 26 T.C. at 202.
Id. at 204.
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fessional reputation is taxable. The Draper court did not specifically
rule on the tax consequences of a defamation award since the petitioner did not receive one. Thus, it would be questionable logic for a
court to cite to the Draperdecision in support of the proposition that
an award for the defamation of an individual's professional reputation is taxable. Moreover, it is quite possible that the Draper court
misinterpreted the underlying source of the expenses involved.
Draper, a professional dancer, was accused of being a Communist. 234
In 1948, within the historical framework of the Cold War,2 35 the
false accusation would obviously have represented a severe stigma to
an individual. Therefore, although the record is devoid of any specific information, it is possible that Draper adopted a trial strategy
focusing on damage to his professional reputation although in reality
the nature of the claim was to his personal reputation. This tactic
would have directed the jurors' attention to his loss of profits as opposed to his loss of self-esteem. Therefore, in reality, the legal expenses incurred would have constituted personal expenditures and
should not have been deductible.
B. Recent Cases
In Seay v. Commissioner,236 the petitioner threatened to initiate
a counter-suit against Froedtert Malt Corporation for causing him
embarrassment which damaged his personal reputation. a7 The suit
never came to fruition since a settlement was reached in which Seay
received $105,000.238 Of this amount, the petitioner reported
$60,000 as ordinary income (representing one year's salary) 239 and
the remaining $45,000 as non-taxable.24 0 The company agreed that
the $45,000 paid to Seay, as well as additional sums to other individuals, were paid "'as compensation for such personal embarrassment,
234. Id. at 202.
235. For a general discussion of the Cold War see W. LIPPMANN, THE COLD WAR: A
STUDY IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. See Church v. Commissioner, TAX CT. REP. (CCH) Dec.
No. 40,216 (June 20, 1983) (former Arizona attorney general's political career was ruined
when he was falsely accused of being a communist).
236. 58 T.C. 32 (1972), acq. 1972-2 C.B. 3. For a critique of the Seay decision, see, in
general, Comment, supra note 204.
237. The company terminated the plaintiff's employment as president and when he refused to vacate the premises, sought an injunction to keep him from managing the company or
occupying the premises. The filing of the complaint was printed in newspapers including the
Wall Street Journal. 58 T.C. at 33-34.
238. Id. at 35.
239. Id. Seay deducted his legal fees from that amount.
240. Id. at 36.
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pnental and physical strain and injury to health and personal reputation in the community' as the members of the Seay group had suffered." 24 The Commissioner, however, levied a deficiency on Seay
2 42
for the $45,000, claiming that this sum also represented income.
The Tax Court held that the additional $45,000 was excludable from
gross income since it was covered by section 104(a)(2) 43a Furthermore, the court stated an essential principle: it is "the nature of the
claim settled and not the validity of the claim" 244 which is decisive in
determining if section 104(a)(2) applies. 45 Consequently, since the
company agreed that the $45,000 was paid as compensation for
damage to Seay's personal reputation, there was a personal injury
award as encompassed in section 104(a)(2).248
Six years later, the Tax Court decided Wolfson v. Commissioner.247 The petitioner in Wolfson instituted suit against his former
employer originally seeking $144,000 for lost income and damages to
his professional reputation as well as reinstatement to his former position at Wayne State University. 48 The petitioner received a verdict
for $175,000 but was not reinstated. 249 He appealed, but before the
case was heard, the parties reached a settlement in which the petitioner received $105,000 and his employer agreed to correct his record to reflect the fact that the petitioner was a member of the
faculty of the school of medicine during the disputed period.250
The Tax Court, affirmed on appeal, 25 1 noted that Wolfson did
not address the issue of whether damages to a professional reputation should be considered taxable. 52 Although Wolfson originally alleged damage to his professional reputation in the state court proceeding,253 in the Tax Court he "rel[ied] solely upon his [revised]
contention that the damages were [in reality] for libel to his personal
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 35 (citation omitted).

247.

47 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 78, 445, 1852 (1978), arid and remanded,651 F.2d 1228 (6th

Id.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 37-38

Cir. 1981).
248.

Id. at 1856.

249. Id. at 1857.
250. Id. Wayne State University also agreed to forward this information to any individual who might inquire as to the plaintiff's relationship with the school.
251. 652 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1981).
252. Wolfson, 47 T.C.M. at 1859 n.9.

253. Id. at 1859-60.
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reputation; accordingly, petitioner did not adopt an alternative position in the event we found that damages were to his business reputation." 254 The Tax Court concluded that the $105,000 payment was
made on account of damages to the petitioner's professional reputation.2 55 The Tax Court held that since the "petitioner [did] not address the issue of whether damages to an employee's professional
reputation are excludable from income, apparently conceding the validity of Rev. Rul. 58-418. .

.

.We hold the amounts are includable

in income. ' 256 The court further concluded this issue with the following statement:
We expressly leave open the questions, however, of whether there is
a valid distinction between damage to one's personal reputation
and damage to an employee's professional reputation for purposes
of section 104(a)(2), and, assuming there is a valid distinction,
whether an award for damages to an employee's professional25repu7
tation nonetheless represents a nontaxable return of capital.
In retrospect, had the petitioner's attorney argued that, for tax
purposes, there is no reason to differentiate between the two types of
reputations, the award received might have been excludable from
gross income. In his presentation to the court, the attorney should
have focused the court's attention on the policy behind section
104(a)(2),258 prior case law, 259 and the personal nature of the petitioner's injury.260
Three years later, the Tax Court in Glynn v. Commissioner,26 '
stated in dictum that:
[P]ayments for injury to professional reputation are not excludable
from gross income, since any damages alleged to have been paid as
a result of such injury would not fall within the exclusion afforded
payments for injuries to personal reputation. Rather, they would
more properly be characterized as payments made in satisfaction of
injuries to petitioner's business reputation as compensation for past
or future income which might have been or might be lost, and thus,
254. Id. at 1859 n.9.
255. Id. at 1859.
256. Id. at 1860.
257. Id. (citations omitted).
258. See supra notes 110-53 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 164-257 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 261-87 and
accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 145-63 and accompanying text.
261. Glynn v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 116 (1981), arid mem., 676 F.2d 682 (Ist Cir.
1982).
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being compensatory
by nature, would be taxable as ordinary
26 2
income.
This dicta represents a questionable position for the court to
have taken in light of prior case law and the cases cited in support of
its position. Specifically, the Glynn court cites to Hawkins263 and
Agar 26' for analogous support of its proposition. As previously explained, 2 5 however, neither Hawkins nor Agar could be said to provide this court with the logical foundation to reach its conclusion."6
The Hawkins court never addressed the tax consequences of an
award for libel to a professional reputation and the Agar court was
uncertain whether a reputation could be realistically bifurcated and
consequently, whether an award for professional reputation would be
taxable.26 Furthermore, Wolfson,2 6 a recent case decided before
Glynn, expressly left open the questions of whether a valid distinction exists between the two types of reputations and assuming such a
distinction existed, whether an award for damage to a professional
reputation would be taxable.269
Thus, despite the fact that the Roemer Tax Court misinterpreted these cases in determining that defamation to an individual's
professional reputation is taxable, the Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to not only correct its result-which it did-but also to rectify
its interpretation of the foregoing decisions. Unfortunately, the circuit court chose to disregard an analysis of these relevant cases and
narrowly decided the case on state law grounds.270
C.

Why Rely on Glynn as opposed to Evans, Anderson and
Gunderson?

If one merely focuses on the dicta contained in the Glynn court
262. Id. at 120 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The court never had to address the taxability question of an award for defamation of professional reputation because the
court held that the settlement was essentially severance pay and did not arise from tort-like

injuries to the petitioner's person as required under § 104(a)(2). Id.
263.
264.

Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927), acq. 7-1 C.B. 14 (1928).
Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961), affg 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 116

(1960).
265.

See supra notes 96-102, 204, 207-22 and accompanying text.

266. The Glynn court could have used Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18 as better support for its dictum statement. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
267. See supra text accompanying note 220.
268. Wolfson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (P-H) 78,445 (1978), affid and remanded,
651 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1981); see supra notes 247-57 and accompanying text.
269. See supra text accompanying note 257.
270. Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697.
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opinion, then the Roemer Tax Court's decision is not necessarily
wrong; the soundness of this dicta, however, is questionable. In Evans v. Commissioner,7 1 the Tax Court held that in the absence of
an allocation among several claims of the $25,000 received by the
petitioner upon termination of his services at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale ("SIUC"), the entire settlement must be included in the petitioner's gross income. 2 The petitioner alleged that
the amount received was solely to compromise his claim of professional defamation, and an allocation was unnecessary.2 73 The court
determined, however, that the "intent of SIUC was to settle all disputed claims, whether in tort or contract, arising out of termination
of [petitioner's] employment .

.. ,

".

Thus, the nature of the claim

was contractual. In support of its position, the court focused on the
release signed by the petitioner which stated that the release was in
"'settlement of any and all claims arising out of the employment or
the lack thereof of [the petitioner].' ",275 In addition, the release included "an express denial of liability" by his employer. In the absence of a portion of the lump sum payment allocated to a tort
claim, the court had no choice but to include the money received in
the petitioner's gross income. 7 It is interesting to note the extent to
which the court analyzed the evidence and determined that the nature of the claim was not solely defamation to the petitioner's profes27 8
sional reputation.
The court, following the Glynn approach, could have rejected
the petitioner's claim and still have reached the same outcome because recoveries for defamation of professional reputations are taxable. The court, however, chose not to employ this approach. Therefore, it can be reasonably inferred from the court's analysis that
damages for defamation to an individual's professional reputation
would be treated as a tort claim under section 104(a)(2) and consequently, excludable from gross income. It should, nevertheless, be
271.
272.

40 T.C.M. (CCH) 260 (1980).
Id. at 263 (citation omitted).

273. Id. at 262. Plaintiff had earlier demanded that the release state that it was for, but

"not limited to lack of due process, professional defamation, and damage to professional reputation." Id.
274. Id. at 263. The court found the intent of the payor was to settle "claims based on

petitioner's employment contract as well as upon petitioner's claim of professional defamation." Id.
275. Id. at 262 (citation omitted).
276. Id.
277.

Id.

278. See id. at 262-63.
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noted that the court does state in a footnote that "[w]e do not reach
the issue of whether, as petitioner argues, a meaningful distinction
does not exist between professional defamation and personal defamation. 278 Yet, when one focuses on the language used at the end of
the court's opinion, a different conclusion could be reached. The
court states that "[iun the absence of an allocation of the settlement
among the various claims, all of the payment must be included in
petitioner's gross income. '280 Thus, if an allocation had been made
to the claim for defamation to the petitioner's professional reputation, then that portion of the award would be non-taxable.
Furthermore, this same conclusion could be reached from the
cases of Anderson v. Commissioner281 and Gunderson v. Commissioner.28 2 In both of these cases, a professor executed a release either
similar to or identical to the one executed by the petitioner in Evans.213 The petitioners, however, did not assert a claim for professional defamation in their negotiations with the university. 24 There
was no allocation of the settlement and the intent of the university
was to make a lump sum settlement on a contractual claim so that
the entire amount would be includable in the petitioner's gross income. 285 This did not, however, prevent these courts from making
extensive analyses to determine whether, in fact, the petitioners
presented a tort-type claim involving damage to their professional
reputations. 8 If awards for defamation to an individual's professional reputation were taxable, then arguably these courts would not
have bothered with their analyses.
Therefore, applying the courts' rationale in Evans, Anderson
and Gunderson, if Roemer's award was granted for defamation to
his professional reputation-a tort-type action 2 87-- then the entire
279.
280.

Id. at 263 n.4 (citations omitted).
Id. at 263 (citation and footnote omitted).

281.

38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1206 (1979).

282. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 464 (1979).
283. These cases are discussed in Evans, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) at 263 n.5. All three were
released from employment surrounding the same state budget cut.
284. Anderson, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1208; Gunderson, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 465.
285. Anderson, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1208-09; Gunderson, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 465.
286. Anderson, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1208-09; Gunderson, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 465.
Anderson also noted that the court was "not called upon to decide whether damages received
for 'professional defamation, and damage to professional reputation' qualifi[ed] as damages
received 'on account of personal injuries' within the meaning of sec. 104(a)(2)." 38 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 1208 n.5 (citations omitted).

287.

Defamation is a tort. Consequently, irrespective of what aspect of an individual is

defamed, it still remains a tort.
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award should be non-taxable. It is unclear why the Roemer Tax
Court cited Glynn and did not apply the cases of Evans, Anderson,
and Gunderson in determining the taxability of Roemer's damage
award. Moreover, had the Ninth Circuit in Roemer been willing to
focus its analysis on these relevant federal Tax Court decisions, it
could have easily circumvented any future misplaced reliance on
Glynn.
D.

Why Must a Distinction Be Made?

The Roemer Tax Court held that "a distinction must be
made"288 between an individual's personal and professional reputation. The crucial question which then arises is: Why must such a
distinction be made? "[T]he law recognizes in every man a right to
have the estimation in which he stands in the opinion of others unaffected by false statements to his discredit . .

,.".
In addition, soci-

ety retains a strong commitment in preventing attacks upon reputation. 290 The individual's right to the protection of his own good name
"reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and
worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent
'29 1
system of ordered liberty.
In determining whether a settlement was intended as compensation
for personal injuries the validity of the claim is irrelevant. Petitioner must show the nature of the claim which was the basis of
settlement. To determine the nature of the claim settled, the focal
292

point is the intention of the payor.

In a defamation suit, the payor-defendant is required to pay for the
actual harm inflicted by his defamatory falsehood including "impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation and mental anguish and suffering. 29 The defendant is paying
for the personal injury inflicted, which is, therefore, a tort-type action. In Roemer, the petitioner presented a personal injury claim to
the Tax Court. At trial, the value of his lost profits was stressed to
assist the jury in estimating his damages. 294 These lost profits, how288.
289.

Roemer, 79 T.C. at 405.
Scott v. Sampson, 8 Q.B.D. 491, 503 (1882).

290. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) (Brennan, J.).
291.

Id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).

292. Evans, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) at 262 (citations omitted).
293. See L. ELDREDGE, supra note 14, at 2 n.3 (quoting Gertz. v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).
294. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 413 (Forrester, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying
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ever, were in no way determinative of the essential nature of his
claim.
Thus, when an individual's professional reputation is defamed,
his personal reputation suffers as well, since the former is merely a
manifestation of the latter. Roemer claimed that, prior to the time
Retail Credit published its report, he enjoyed a good name and a fine
reputation with respect to high standards of business, service rendered to clients, credit standing, honesty, integrity, and financial responsibility. 29 5 As a result of these attributes, Roemer enjoyed the
continued patronage of his clients and employers. 96 Moreover, the
success of the petitioner's insurance business depended on these personal characteristics as well as on his quality of service and high
standards of business practice. 9 Thus, Roemer's professional reputation for being an honest and sincere businessman was simply a
manifestation of the qualities which comprised his personal nature.
Therefore, the Roemer case exemplifies the notion that defamation
suits represent tort-type claims encompassed under section 104(a)(2)
because the nature of the claim is of a personal injury type. Consequently, the entire award in such litigation should be considered nontaxable. In addition, it is unnecessary to distinguish, as did the Roemer Tax Court, between an individual's occupation and reputation, 298 since once a defamation suit is involved, any award is inherently personal for tax purposes and no further analysis should be
required.
The Ninth Circuit astutely observed that such an artificial bifurcation of personal and professional reputation is illogical. Furthermore, although it correctly determined that the proper focus should
be on the personal-nonpersonal distinction for section 104(a)(2) purposes, ascertaining whether the underlying award is, in fact, personal
may still be problematic since one is relegated to the applicable state
law.

note 62.
295. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 401.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298.

Id. at 405-06; see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

"An action for defamation has been traditionally regarded as
that part of tort law which protects the interest of a person in his
reputation ..

A reputation, unlike material things in life, is

".."299

practically impossible to regain once it has been defamed.300 According to the Tax Court in Roemer, defamation to an individual's professional reputation is not a personal injury for purposes of determining the taxability of defamation awards under section 104(a)(2).30 1
The IRC is devoid of any justification for section 104(a)(2).
The Ninth Circuit, in reversing the Tax Court's decision, has established that the relevant distinction for this exclusion is between personal and nonpersonal injury as opposed to physical and nonphysical
injury.30 2 Therefore, the ruined career and shattered dreams of Roemer constituted a personal injury and the award received was nontaxable. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that under California state
law the tort of defamation is a personal injury.303 Furthermore, it
determined that there is no reason to differentiate for tax purposes
between defamation to an individual's personal and professional reputations; recoveries in both situations are non-taxable. Although the
Ninth Circuit appears to have incorporated a Suffered-Enough Concept into its analysis of section 104(a)(2), °4 as a result of its narrow
construction of the applicability of this concept, the potential still
exists for a taxable award in this area.
The Ninth Circuit should have established a broader interpretation of the Suffered-Enough Concept, as the relevant policy reason
behind section 104(a)(2). This would guarantee judicial recognition
of Congress' intent to confer a humanitarian benefit on the victim.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit should have correlated the SufferedEnough Concept with the established federal tax law in order to insure a uniform nationwide application of section 104(a)(2) where an
individual's reputation has been defamed.
Stuart M. Schabes

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

See L. ELDREDGE, supra note 14, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 10-11.
Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 696.
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